Recent experimental evidence supports the in ‡uence of a player's unchosen alternatives in other agent's actions. This paper examines a tractable theoretical model of reference-dependent preferences in which individuals compare other players'chosen action with respect to their unchosen alternatives. We analyze the equilibrium prediction in complete information sequentialmove games, and compare it with that of standard games where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., with strictly individualistic preferences), our model predicts higher cooperation among the players than standard game-theoretic models. In addition, our framework embodies di¤erent behavioral models, such as social status acquisition and intentions-based reciprocity, as special cases. Finally, we con…rm our results in three economic applications: the ultimatum bargaining game, the labor market gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game.
Introduction
Recent advances in behavioral economics allow for the possibility that individuals care about the payo¤s of others. In particular, most of these advances suggest the existence of social, as opposed to individual, preferences re ‡ecting individuals'predilection for fairness in the income distribution; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) .
Despite the multiple situations that can be rationalized with these approaches, a recent literature suggests that individuals' behavior cannot be explained by theories on social preferences alone.
Speci…cally, an agent's choices can only be supported by analyzing how she evaluates other players' chosen and unchosen actions. Speci…cally, they consider two treatments. In the …rst one, represented in …gure 1(a), the proposer chooses among two divisions of the pie, (0.2,0.8) and (0.125,0.875) -where the …rst and second component of every pair denote the receiver and proposer's payo¤, respectively. In the second treatment, as …gure 1(b) indicates, the …rst available division (0.2,0.8) is unchanged, while the second division becomes (0.875,0.125). Importantly, they show that, conditional on division 0.2 being o¤ered to the responder (bold lines in the …gures), the proportion of receiver's rejections is signi…cantly higher when the unchosen division of the pie that the proposer did not select was 0.875 (…gure 1b) than when it was 0.125 (…gure 1a). That is, for a given o¤er 0.2 to the responder, the proportion of rejections increases in the share of the pie that the responder could have received.
Intuitively, the receiver positively evaluates a given o¤er when the alternative division of the pie is below the actual o¤er that the proposer makes him (he infers "kindness"), and negatively otherwise (he interprets "unkindness"). Certainly, the receiver's pattern of rejections cannot be rationalized using inequity aversion. Indeed, once o¤er (0.2,0.8) is made in both treatments, the inequity in the payo¤ distribution is constant across treatments, and yet the receiver's behavior is di¤ erent across treatments. The receiver's rejecting pattern cannot be explained using chosen actions either, since the proposer's chosen o¤er is constant across treatments but the receiver's behavior is not.
Instead, any rationalization of the previous results must rely on the receiver's comparison between the actions that the proposer chooses and those he does not (unchosen actions).
References to unchosen actions are nevertheless not restricted to economic contexts alone. For instance, we frequently encounter references to unchosen alternatives in the way in which many national and international policies are announced to the media. Indeed, these public presentations are often accompanied with statements like "The government/organization/…rm had to choose between policies A and B, and choosing A would have been so much worse that we …nally decided to select B." These statements are certainly e¤ective when they induce the listener to positively evaluate the chosen action B relative to the unchosen action A.
In this study we introduce a model that rationalizes these economic conducts in complete information sequential-move games within a general framework of economic behavior. Speci…cally, we assume that as in standard models, every player cares about her material payo¤. Additionally, we consider that every individual compares other players'actually chosen actions with respect to a particular action that they could have selected (other players' foregone actions). Hence, this particular action is used by every individual as a reference point to measure the kindness she perceives from other players'choices.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we identify conditions under which players' equilibrium actions are higher when individuals are concerned about these reference-dependent comparisons than when they are not. In particular, this set of conditions allow for a direct prediction about whether players cooperation when they are concerned about relative comparisons is either higher or lower than in standard game-theoretic models, for a broad class of relative comparisons players might use. Importantly, it examines players'cooperation even when they are not concerned about each other's material payo¤s. Indeed, unlike models with inequity averse individuals where players do care about other individuals'payo¤s (social preferences), this paper analyzes conditions under which agents choose higher strategy levels than in standard models without the need to assume that they care about other people's payo¤s, i.e., even when agents' preferences can be regarded as "strictly individualistic."Second, we show that the model this paper describes embeds as special cases existing behavioral models: from models on inequity aversion to those analyzing social status acquisition. Finally, we apply our model to di¤erent economic applications where we enhance the intuitions behind our results: the ultimatum bargaining game, the labor market gift exchange game, and the sequential public good game. Our equilibrium predictions are not only validated in these applied settings, but also con…rmed by recent experimental data.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the literature on social preferences and intentions-based reciprocity, their relationship with our paper, and how it complements their approach. In section three, we describe the properties that players' utility function must satisfy in order to support our results in terms of higher degrees of cooperation.
Furthermore, section four analyzes players' equilibrium strategy in these sequential-move games, and section …ve applies the model to three economic examples. Finally, the last section discusses some conclusions of the paper as well as its further extensions. 
where x i is player i's payo¤. Intuitively, i represents the disutility from allocations that are disadvantageously unequal for player i (i.e., he may feel envy about player j's payo¤s), while i denotes the guilt feeling from being the agent with the highest payo¤ of the population. 1 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also develop a similar (yet more general) model of inequity aversion in which individuals' utility is assumed to be increasing and concave in their share of total income, i.e., people experience a positive but diminishing marginal utility from receiving a higher share of the total amount of social payo¤s. These models of social preferences, however, cannot rationalize the puzzling experimental evidence presented in the introduction. 2 Indeed, any model which explains such results must necessarily complement the above speci…cation by introducing the importance of unchosen alternatives into player i's utility function, as this paper examines. 3 1 Interestingly, Blanco et al (2007) present experimental evidence supporting inequity aversion at the aggregate level (across all participants of a particular game) but refuting it at the individual level (for a particular participant across games). Their results can be con…rmed by our model, whereby participants of a particular game exhibit concerns for unchosen alternatives, but they may use di¤erent foregone options across games as a reference point for comparison. 2 Another interesting experimental paper that also tests whether payo¤ distributions su¢ ce to explain players' behavior in the ultimatum bargaining game is Bereby-Meyer and Niederle (2005) . Speci…cally, they show that the responder is more likely to reject low o¤ers when a rejection payo¤ is accrued to a third player -with no strategic role in the ultimatum bargaining game-than when such payo¤ is accrued to the proposer. 3 Some axiomatic approaches on inequity aversion, such as Segal and Sobel (1999) , examine what conditions on players' preferences must be satis…ed in order to obtain utility functions which can be represented as a weighted average of a player's own material payo¤ as well as that of others. Despite their interest, our approach di¤ers from
Models on intentions-based reciprocity
As suggested above, this paper is more in the line of Charness and Rabin (2002) , whereby they analyze the intentions that players express with their actual choices along the game. In particular, they assume that agents evaluate multiple characteristics of the equilibrium allocation -including fairness and intentions-by establishing di¤erent comparisons between own and social payo¤s (i.e., between x i and x j ). Speci…cally, when only intentions are considered, agent i's utility function in Charness and Rabin's (2002) model reduces to
where player j's misbehavior can implicitly include player i's concern about player j's foregone options, and where represents the importance of intentions-based reciprocity for player i. Note, however, that player i's disutility from player j's misbehavior is scaled up by the di¤erence between player i and j's payo¤s, x i x j . Certainly, this confounds the elements triggering such perception of misbehavior (which implicitly includes unchosen alternatives), and how this misbehavior is then measured (by considering inequity aversion). Likewise, most of the experimental literature testing reciprocating behaviors triggered by kind intentions also considers that agent i measures player j's intentions by comparing x i and x j ; see Cox (2001 Cox ( , 2003 .
Similarly, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) recently analyze how a given player i evaluates the kindness inferred from player j's actions by also comparing their payo¤s. In particular, that study measures kindness by considering the product of two elements: the above interpersonal payo¤ comparison (what they refer as the "outcome term"), and a measure of other players' intentions which re ‡ects the set of available choices for these players (the "intentions factor"). Hence, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume that the reference standard with which players compare their own payo¤ is that of other players (i.e., the payo¤ distribution), and then they scale up this payo¤ distribution according to the degree of freedom in the other players'available choices.
Finally, Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2007) construct a nonparametric model in which a player's preferences become more altruistic with respect to other players when she infers that these players have behaved generously with her. However, their notion of generosity is not equivalent to our de…nition of kindness, nor their notion of altruism coincides with our de…nition of reciprocity, since they assume that players compare their payo¤s with that of others in their group. Unlike these models, we do not introduce other people's payo¤s into player i's evaluation of intentions or kindness. Instead, in our model player i measures the kindness in player j's actions by comparing player j's chosen and unchosen (foregone) actions. In the following section we describe how this comparison is made, and how it encompasses models on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
theirs, since we not only include players'actually chosen actions in their utility function (as they do), but also players' unchosen actions.
Model
Let us consider complete information sequential-move games with two players and two stages. In particular, we examine games G = hS i ; S j ; u i ; u j i, in which a female leader (player j) selects an action s j 2 S j R + , and afterwards a male follower (player i) chooses an action s i 2 S i R + . The leader's action may represent, for instance, her wage o¤er to a worker, or her monetary contribution to a public good. Similarly, the follower's action may denote, respectively, his e¤ort level in a labor market game, or his monetary donation to a charity in the sequential public good game. (Note that for simplicity we describe our model for continuous action spaces. Nonetheless, all our assumptions can be extended to discrete action spaces as well). Every action pro…le s = (s i ; s j ) 2 S i S j is then mapped into the set of possible outcomes by function out : S i S j ! X. Note that an outcome, out(s), in the ultimatum bargaining game is a monetary amount, while in public good games is a pair composed of an amount of private goods and the total contributions to the public good. Finally, every player i assigns a utility value to every outcome through her utility function
Note that the outcome function maps every action pro…le into a single outcome, i.e., there is a unique action pro…le leading to every terminal node of the game. Hence, for every outcome out(s) 2 X we can identify the unique action pro…le s = (s i ; s j ) which induces this outcome. This allows utility function u i : X ! R to be represented over action pro…les in the form
Speci…cally, superscript NC denotes that player i is "not concerned" about player j's unchosen alternatives, as opposed to superscript C, which we use in the next section to refer to players who are "concerned"about each others'unchosen actions. Finally, let us henceforth denote by single (double) subscripts in the utility function its …rst (and second) order derivatives.
Assumption A1. Positive but decreasing marginal bene…t from other players' actions, s j . That is, U N C s j (s i ; s j ) 0 U N C s j s j (s i ; s j ) for all s i and s j .
Thus, every player i bene…ts from increases in other players'actions, but at a decreasing rate.
Note that we are deliberately vague about how U N C i (s i ; s j ) increases (or decreases) in her own action s i . In this way, we can capture models where players'marginal utility from increasing her action is positive (e.g., contributions in public good games) as well as negative (e.g., e¤ort in labor market games). Next, we assume that player i's utility function is strictly concave in his own actions, s i .
Assumption A2. Concavity. U N C s i s i (s i ; s j ) < 0 for all s i and s j .
Note that concavity did not hold in the motivating example discussed in the introduction since players' action space was discrete and binary. Nonetheless, we introduce this assumption given that it guarantees the existence of a unique equilibrium when players'action space is continuous.
In particular, uniqueness will facilitate the comparison of the equilibrium prediction when players
are not concerned about unchosen alternatives, and that when players are concerned. 4 Assumption A3. Strategic Substitutability. Player j's (…rst mover) utility function satis…es U N C s j s i (s i ; s j ) < 0 for all s i and s j .
Thus, the …rst mover's marginal bene…t from increasing her own action, s j , decreases when the second mover raises her action, s i . That is, the leader considers the follower's actions as strategic substitutes of her own. This assumption is sensible for a large class of games, where players try to free-ride each others' actions, e.g., the …rst mover's incentives to free-ride the second mover's donations to the public good or his e¤ort decision. Therefore, A3 eliminates payo¤ structures such as those in the impunity game, whereby (in a variation of the ultimatum bargaining game) the …rst mover obtains exactly the same payo¤ regardless of the second mover's actions, i.e., unconditional on his acceptance or rejection of the …rst mover's o¤er. In contrast, A3 maintains the …rst mover's incentives to free-ride the second mover's action, since she considers players' actions as strategic substitutes.
How kindness enters into players'preferences
As suggested in the motivating example from Brandts and Solà (2001), players'observed behavior is clearly inconsistent across the games in their example. The games they consider are nevertheless relatively similar, since only the set of available choices for the proposer is modi…ed. In particular,
we want to describe a single utility function which is general enough to be applicable to games maintaining "similar" properties, as the two treatments considered by Brandts and Solà (2001) .
Speci…cally, in this paper we regard games as being similar when the utility that player i obtains from every action pro…le s coincides across the games for which this action pro…le induces the same outcome out(s), and out(s) 2 X. (In the previous example of the ultimatum bargaining game, if a given action pro…le induces the same outcome across di¤erent games then the utility that players obtain from this action pro…le coincide across these games.) In particular, let U C i (s i ; s j ) represent the utility function we apply to this class of games. Speci…cally, U C i (s i ; s j ) is player i's utility function when he uses player j's foregone options as a measure of the kindness behind her actions.
Let us …rst describe how this kindness enters into player i's utility function, and then analyze how players measure the kindness behind their opponent's actions. Assumption A4. Kindness. For any actions s i 2 S i and s j 2 S j , player i's utility function satis…es
Therefore, this assumption determines when player i is concerned about social comparisons and he interprets kindness from player j's actions, his utility level is higher than when he is not concerned about these comparisons. Otherwise (when he infers unkindness), his utility level is lower. Let us next describe how this kindness a¤ects player i's marginal utility.
Assumption A5. Reciprocity. For any actions s i 2 S i and s j 2 S j , player i's utility function satis…es
Hence, A5 speci…es that when player i interprets kindness from player j's actions, his marginal utility from increasing s i when he is concerned about foregone options is weakly higher than when he is not. Otherwise, his marginal utility is lower. This property is illustrated in …gure A1 (see appendix). In particular, this assumption leads player i to increase his action when he infers kindness (positive reciprocity), and to decrease it when he infers unkindness (negative reciprocity).
How players measure kindness
Let us now describe how players evaluate the kindness behind other players'actions. In particular, we assume that player i measures kindness through the following distance function, D i (s i ; s j ), and that he infers kindness when the outcome of this distance function is positive, and unkindness otherwise.
for any i 2 R, where i can be both positive or negative. Thus, player i evaluates player j's kindness by comparing player j's actually chosen action, s j , and a particular reference action that player i uses for comparison, s R i j (s i ; s j ) 2 S j , among player j's available choices, as de…ned below. 5 For simplicity, this distance function was chosen to be linear. Nonetheless, from a more general 5 Note that, for simplicity, we assume that player i compares player j's actions, instead of the payo¤s resulting from these action choices. Choosing the latter, however, would not modify our results, since player i's payo¤s are increasing in player j's action choices (assumption A1). Hence, both a de…nition of kindness based on the payo¤s that player i obtains from player j's choices and a de…nition directly based on these choices increase in player j's action choices.
perspective, player i's distance function could be nonlinear, as long as it increases in player j's actually chosen strategy, s j , and decreases in the reference action that player i uses for comparison.
We consider that this reference-dependent measure is a natural way for player i to assess player j's actions, which is yet general enough to embed di¤erent behavioral models as special cases, as this paper shows. In particular, this distance function is similar to that in the literature on reference-dependent preferences, such as Köszegi and Rabin (2006) . However, their model analyzes individual decision making, unlike this paper where we examine the strategic e¤ects of such reference-dependent preferences. On the other hand, our distance function di¤ers from that in Rabin (1993) for simultaneous-move games and that in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for sequential-move games. Indeed, these studies assume that player i compares his actual payo¤ with respect to the "equitable" payo¤ (his equitable share in the Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s). In contrast,
we allow player i to compare player j's actually chosen action with respect to any feasible action, Hence, player i can use any of player j's available actions in S j as a reference point. 6 That is,
j (s i ; s j ) is allowed to be above/below/equal to player j's actually chosen action, s j , which leads to negative/positive/null distances, respectively. Obviously, the particular sign of such distance a¤ects player i's utility function, U C i (s i ; s j ), as described above. Additionally, note that when both players' strategy spaces are identical, S i = S j = S, player i's reference point function becomes
In this context, the reference point function can be, for instance, s
, and player i compares player j's chosen action, s j , with respect to her own, s i . In particular, note two speci…c examples of this distance function. First, when i > 0, it may represent the case that s j > s i is interpreted by player i as a signal of player j's kindness (e.g., her commitment to contribute high donations to the public good), whereas s j < s i is evaluated by player i as a sign of unkindness by her opponent (e.g., free-riding). The second example is related to players' concerns for status acquisition. Particularly, when i < 0, player i makes the same comparison, but introduces the outcome of D i (s i ; s j ) into her utility function
In these cases, player i may evaluate s j > s i negatively because the action space represents for example the consumption of a given positional good that enhances social status, and that player i wants to acquire. Furthermore, we allow player i to modify the reference action he uses to compare player j's actually chosen action, i.e., s R i j (s i ; s j ) is not restricted to be constant for all s j . In particular, we only assume that, for a given increase in player j's action, s j , the reference point that player i uses,
does not increase as fast as player j's action, i.e., 1 @s R i j (s i ; s j ) =@s j . Intuitively, this condition makes higher values of player j's action meaningful for player i, since they increase the outcome of his distance function, i.e., @D i (s i ; s j )=@s j = 1 @s R i j (s i ; s j ) =@s j ; and as we described above, positive distances ultimately raise player i's utility level (kindness). As a remark, note that D i (s i ; s j ) does not depend on any possible randomness over payo¤s. Indeed, player i's utility level does not depend on the di¤erence between payo¤s he could have received from the outcomes of a certain lottery, but only on payo¤s he could have obtained from alternative choices of the other players. This distinction di¤erentiates our approach from regret theory, as in Loomes and Sugden (1982) , since our model focuses on agent i's evaluation of other players'chosen and unchosen actions as a measure of their kindness. Finally, extending assumption A2 to the context of concerned players, we assume that U C i (s i ; s j ) is also strictly concave in all player i's action, s i .
Best response function
The previous section described the structure behind players' preferences, how they evaluate the kindness behind other players' actions, and how this kindness enters into their utility function.
In this section, we turn to examine players' best response function in these games. Let Lemma 1. The slope of player i's best response function when he is concerned about foregone options, s C i (s j ), is higher than that when he is not,
That is, when player i assigns a positive importance to foregone options he is more sensitive to increases in player j's actions than when he does not. In addition to being more sensitive, the next proposition shows that in fact he actually responds more (less) cooperatively when he perceives kindness (unkindness) from player j's actions compared to how he would react in the case of being unconcerned about player j's unchosen alternatives. Proposition 1. Player i's best response function when he is concerned about foregone options is higher than that when he is not if player i infers kindness from player j's actions; and lower if he infers unkindness. That is,
Intuitively, player i (when concerned about player j's foregone options) responds more cooperatively to what he perceives as kind actions, D i (s i ; s j ) 0, than when he is unconcerned, i.e.,
The opposite happens when he interprets that player j's actions are unkind,
In other words, his interpretation of kind (or unkind) actions triggers a higher (lower) response when he is concerned about foregone options than when he is not. For example, the worker in the labor market gift exchange game, when perceiving kind actions from the …rm manager, exerts a higher e¤ort when he is concerned about the …rm manager's unchosen alternatives (foregone wage o¤ers) than when he is not, and a lower e¤ort otherwise.
Equilibrium analysis
Recall that player j represents the …rst mover in this complete information sequential-move game, and player i denotes the second mover. Note that player i's best response function, s C i (s j ), in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game was already described in the above lemma 1 and proposition 1. Let us now analyze player j's (…rst mover) equilibrium action in this sequential game.
Lemma 2. The leader's marginal utility from increasing her own action s j is higher when the follower is concerned about her unchosen alternatives than when he is not. That is, for any action s j 2 S j player j's (…rst mover) utility function satis…es,
From this lemma, the following proposition is immediately derived.
That is, the leader's equilibrium strategy when dealing with a follower who is concerned about foregone options, s C j , is weakly higher than her equilibrium strategy when facing a follower not concerned about foregone options, s N C j .
Hence, in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy pro…le of the game with positive concerns for foregone options the leader chooses a higher equilibrium action than that in the game with no concerns for unchosen alternatives. 7 This result is especially relevant for certain games, such as the labor market gift exchange and the sequential public good game, where the introduction of concerns for foregone options leads to higher levels of cooperation among the players. In particular, as we show in section 5 for di¤erent economic applications, the fact that the follower is sensitive to the leader's unchosen alternatives attenuates the leader's incentives to shift most of the burden to the follower (reducing free-riding) which ultimately triggers higher actions from her than in standard game-theoretic models. 8 Furthermore, the pro…le of actions that players choose in equilibrium, as we also show in section 5, can better rationalize experimental results of players'observed behavior.
Remarks on inequity aversion and reciprocity
In this paper we analyze how the consideration of foregone options a¤ects players' equilibrium strategies. Nonetheless, in this subsection, we show that (under certain conditions) our model can also support the results of the literature on inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases.
Then, player i's preferences can be represented as a weighted average of her material payo¤ s and those of player j.
In particular, the above proposition uses Segal and Sobel's (1999) results to specify that, when player i compares player j's actually chosen action, s j , with that chosen by herself, s i , her utility function U C i (s i ; s j ) can be represented as an (additively separable) weighted average of both players' material payo¤s. Therefore, in such context our model captures players' concerns for inequity aversion (or altruism) as a special case. In addition, this model also captures the literature on intentions-based reciprocity as a special case. Indeed, the above utility representation embodies Charness and Rabin's (2002) model for the case that player i infers misbehavior from player j's actions, and for i = 1 and j = . That is,
Therefore, when players use their own action s i as a reference point to compare other players' 7 As a remark, note that the follower moves his action choice in the opposite direction than the …rst mover moves her when he regards actions as strategic substitutes (negatively sloped best response function); whereas he moves it in the same direction when actions are strategic complements (positively sloped best response function). 8 These results can be easily generalized to sequential-move games with N players. In such settings, every player measures the kindness he infers from the actually chosen strategies of every player who played before him. The outcome of each of these individual comparisons can then be added up (or even scaled in a weighted average), in order to evaluate player i's distance function. Despite the greater generality of such model, nonetheless, its results and intuition are already captured by the two-player setting we consider in this paper.
actually chosen action, s j , our model embeds both inequity aversion and intentions-based reciprocity as special cases. 9 
Applications
Clearly, if x i > f i , the responder perceives kindness from the proposer, and gets his utility level increased in the second term. This additional utility is, furthermore, increasing in i , the parameter re ‡ecting the importance that the responder assigns to the distance x i f i . Intuitively, perceiving kind actions has greater e¤ects on a receiver who is highly concerned about foregone options than on a receiver with small concerns about them. In addition, when either i = 0 or x i = f i , the receiver's utility function just coincides with his utility when he is not concerned about the proposer's foregone options. In contrast, when x i < f i the second term becomes negative. Now, the responder gets his utility level decreased from the unkindness he perceives from the proposer's actual o¤er, since x i < f i . Next, we check that the responder's utility function satis…es all the assumptions we consider in the previous section.
We now introduce an example, in order to illustrate the main intuition behind the above utility function. In particular, we focus on the comparison between those utility functions analyzed in the literature and that suggested above, by using Brandts and Solà (2001) experimental results. Thus, this o¤er is rejected if and only if the receiver's concern about foregone options is su¢ ciently high, i > 0:29. N Hence, the above utility function is then able to explain why an individualistic responder -who has no concerns about social payo¤s-accepts an o¤er when it is associated to kindness from the proposer, x i > f i , but can reject this same o¤er when he evaluates it as a signal of unkindness.
From the above utility function, we obtain the following result, describing the responder acceptance rule in this example.
Lemma 4. In the ultimatum bargaining game with a responder who assigns a weight i 0 to the proposer's foregone divisions of the pie, f i , the responder accepts any o¤ er x i if and only if
Let us emphasize some interesting insights from the above lemma, illustrated in …gure 2 below.
Clearly, when i = 0 the responder's acceptance rule collapses to x i = 0. Indeed, when the responder does not assign any weight to the proposer's unchosen actions, then any positive division of the pie is accepted by the responder, as in standard ultimatum bargaining games. Furthermore, the responder's acceptance threshold x i is increasing in i , the importance he associates to the proposer's unchosen alternatives, i.e., he becomes more demanding in i . Finally, x i is increasing in f i , the receiver's foregone option (represented by an upward shift in the …gure). Thus, the more demanding the receiver becomes (higher f i ) the more the proposer must o¤er him to induce his acceptance. Importantly, note that the minimum division that the receiver accepts, x i , is smaller than one (the total size of the pie) for any parameter values. Hence, x i leaves some strictly positive portion of the pie to the proposer even when the receiver is extremely demanding (high i and f i ). Intuitively, the above acceptance rule of the responder shows that now the responder is not going to accept any positive o¤er, as the standard ultimatum bargaining game predicts when no concerns about the proposer's foregone options are considered. This fact clearly a¤ects the proposer's optimal strategies. Certainly, if the proposer wants to obtain any positive payo¤ from the game, she must make an o¤er which is accepted by the responder, as we show below.
Proposition 4.
In the ultimatum bargaining game where the responder assigns an importance of i 0 to the options that the proposer forwent, the following strategy pro…le describes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game.
Responder accepts any o¤ er x i such that x i > x i , where
Unlike models where the receiver is not concerned about foregone options -where the proposer keeps the entire pie for himself-the distribution of equilibrium payo¤s when the receiver assigns a positive importance to foregone options is less unequal, as the following corollary speci…es. Corollary 1. The distribution of equilibrium payo¤ s in the ultimatum bargaining game where the responder assigns importance i to the proposer's foregone option, f i , is
Indeed, note that this distribution of payo¤s is more egalitarian than that of models where the receiver is not concerned about foregone options, (x i ; x j ) = (0; 1), for any parameter values. Hence, by considering the proposer's foregone options into the responder's utility function we obtain higher degrees of fairness in the equilibrium payo¤s, as well as higher cooperation between the players. , the small (but positive) percentage of rejections in this case can be supported by players'inequity aversion, since they might dislike the unequal payo¤ distribution resulting from their acceptance of (0.2,0.8). The fact that the responder does not attribute any responsibility to the proposer in settings where the latter does not have any choice to make has been extensively studied by psychologists with the use of attribution theory; see Ross and Fletcher (1985) .
Interestingly, the fact that the acceptance rate in the second column is exactly higher than when he perceives "unkindness" (column 1) but lower than when he infers "kindness" (column 3) supports our results. 12 A similar intuition is also applicable to Brandts and Solà's (2001) results as …gure 3(b) suggests. Hence, both of these studies con…rm our theoretical prediction about the proposer's o¤er. Indeed, proposers are observed to make low o¤ers when kindness can be inferred from such o¤ers (positive distances), and high o¤ers when they are interpreted in terms of unkindness (negative distances).
Labor market gift exchange game
We now apply the above model to a labor market gift exchange game, where the proposer is identi…ed as a …rm making a wage o¤er to a worker, who decides what level of e¤ort to exert. In traditional models without considerations about unchosen options, since e¤ort is costly and the worker is the last player to move, the worker's equilibrium strategy (in the subgame where the worker is called to move) is to exert zero e¤ort regardless of the actual wage o¤er made by the …rm.
Operating by backwards induction, the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game predicts that the …rm o¤ers the lowest possible wage and that workers exert zero e¤ort for any wage o¤ered. These We next suggest a utility function that satis…es the properties considered in section 3 and that can better rationalize the above experimental results. As in previous sections, we assume that the …rm chooses a wage o¤er x i 2 [0; 1] to the worker. Similarly, let f i 2 [0; 1] represent the foregone wage o¤er that the worker uses (s R j ) as a comparison against the actual wage o¤er x i . In particular, let us consider the following utility function for the worker.
The above utility function coincides with the standard utility function of a worker who exerts costly e¤ort when the parameter denoting the importance of foregone options, i , approaches zero.
The third term represents the relevance of the foregone options for the worker, i.e., the wage o¤ers that the …rm did not make when proposing the actual o¤er x i . Note that when the foregone wage proposal is higher than the actual wage o¤ered, x i < f i , then this third term becomes negative, and the worker experiences a disutility from each unit of additional e¤ort exerted. Similarly, when
x i > f i , this third term becomes positive, and the worker interprets that the intentions of the …rm are cooperative. That is, the worker observes that the …rm o¤ered a wage level which is above its foregone option, which in turn increases the worker's utility since he feels treated generously. In particular, this utility function for the worker satis…es all the assumptions we considered in section 3, as the following lemma speci…es.
Intuitively, we should expect that, for proposals with a foregone option below the actual o¤er, the worker should feel pleased by the kindness of the …rm, and responds by exerting a positive level of e¤ort, in contrast to the standard game-theoretic model. These intuitions are con…rmed in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns a value i to the distance between the …rm's actual wage o¤ er and its forgone alternative, the worker's optimal e¤ ort level (in the subgame induced after the wage proposal) is given by
This optimal e¤ort level is then positive if and only if the wage o¤er x i is above the comparative foregone option, x i > f i , for any positive weight to foregone options, i . In addition, an increase in the relative importance that the worker assigns to foregone options increases his optimal e¤ort level, i.e., e (x i ) weakly increases in i . On the other hand, for a given weight on foregone options, i , and for a given wage o¤er x i , optimal e¤ort e (x i ) increases as the comparative foregone option f i decreases. Indeed, if the worker compares the actual wage he receives, x i , with respect to the worst wage o¤er that the …rm manager could ever pay him (e.g., the legal minimum wage), he is easily pleased by many positive wage o¤ers. On the contrary, a worker who compares his relative position with respect to the best wage o¤er that the …rm could a¤ord to pay him certainly evaluates most of the wage o¤ers he receives as a signal of unkindness from the …rm manager. This optimal e¤ort level is illustrated in the above …gures, which include in addition, the worker's e¤ort level e N C (x i ) in the case of assigning no importance to foregone options. Note that e N C (x i ) is ‡at at zero for all x i , since the worker exerts no e¤ort for all wage o¤ers. In both …gures, the worker concerned about foregone options exerts positive e¤orts as long as x i > f i for any positive weight on foregone options. 13 On the one hand, …gure 4(a) indicates how the worker e¤ort pivots upward -with center at x i = f i -when his concerns i about the …rms' unchosen alternatives increase. On the other hand, …gure 4(b) represents how the worker e¤ort shifts upwards when the …rm's unchosen alternative decreases (leftward shift in the horizontal intercept).
Interestingly, these results are not only supported by the aforementioned experimental evidence, but also by recent empirical work. In particular, Mas (2006) shows that police arrest rates and average sentence length decline (and crime reports raise) when the wage increase that police unions obtain is lower than their wage demands, relative to when it is higher. Hence, police union wage demands would work as the reference point which they use in their negotiations for higher salaries with government o¢ cials.
Given the above optimal e¤ort function, and operating by backwards induction, we can …nd the …rm's optimal wage o¤er. Speci…cally, we assume the following (standard) utility function for the …rm, V (s j ; s i ) = (v x i ) e, where v represents the constant productivity of e¤ort (e.g., how worker's e¤ort is transformed into …nal output); and x i denotes, as above, the actual wage o¤er made to the worker. Moreover, v > 1, since the productivity of e¤ort is assumed to be higher than any of the wage o¤ers, x i 2 [0; 1]. Inserting the worker's optimal e¤ort function found above, and manipulating, we …nd the optimal o¤er made by the …rm.
Proposition 5. In the gift exchange game where the worker assigns an importance of i to the distance between the wage o¤ er foregone by the …rm and its actual o¤ er, the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are the following Firm o¤ ers
Worker accepts any o¤ er x i such that x i > 0. In addition, the worker exerts an e¤ ort level of
As the above proposition speci…es, the …rm's optimal o¤er x i is higher than the worker's foregone option, f i (x i ), since v > 1. In addition, x i is increasing in the foregone option, f i (x i ), that the receiver uses to make the comparison with respect 14 to x i . In the standard models where concerns for foregone options are not considered, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game predicts that the worker exerts no positive e¤ort for any wage o¤er, and the …rm, anticipating the worker's move, o¤ers the lowest possible wage. In contrast, in the above environment including the importance of the foregone wage o¤ers for the worker, we found that the …rm makes a positive wage o¤er, since this o¤er can induce a higher level of exerted e¤ort from the worker. That is, by showing kindness in high wage o¤ers, the …rm pleases the worker enough to induce him to exert higher e¤orts.
Clearly, the above equilibrium predictions are closer to the actual experimental results observed in the literature, Fehr and Gachter (2000), which …nd a positive correlation between the wage o¤ered by the …rm and the exerted e¤ort levels from the worker. Many authors have rationalized the above …ndings by using the e¢ ciency wage theory arguments. That is, if a worker is paid above the minimum wage, he has a greater opportunity cost of shirking, which induces him to work harder, and to exert e¤ort levels that are increasing in his wage o¤er. This paper may thus complement this rationalization of the experimental results through e¢ ciency wage theory. Nonetheless, the model we presented above can explain cooperative behavior between employers and workers in the labor market without relying on the worker's opportunity cost of shirking, or his outside options if he is …red.
Finally, these results also provide an interesting explanation for the existence of wage di¤ erentials across industries. Indeed, as Krueger and Summers (1988) show, industry wage di¤erentials are signi…cant even after controlling for individual characteristics and …rm quality; which suggests that these di¤erentials are not just due to unobserved di¤erences in labor quality. Our model then rationalizes this result by predicting that …rms' equilibrium wage o¤er, after controlling for worker's productivity, may vary depending on the particular reference point that each worker uses for comparison.
Sequential public good game
The third game where we introduce the importance of the proposer's foregone options is the sequential public good game (PGG thereafter). Speci…cally, we consider a sequential solicitation game where a …rst mover is asked to submit a donation, s j 2 [0; 1], for the provision of a public good, and observing her donation, a follower decides which is the contribution, s i 2 [0; 1], he makes. In order to be consistent with the games de…ned above, the leader is assumed to not assign any weight to the follower's unchosen actions. In contrast, the follower assigns a relevance i to a speci…c contribution that the leader forwent, and that the follower uses as a reference point for comparison (reference action, s R j ). In particular, leader and follower's utility functions are, respectively
Both of these functions are quasilinear in the private good, z, and their nonlinear part takes into account the utility derived from the total public good provision G = s i + s j (relevant for both players) and the distance i s j s R j , which is only relevant for the follower. For simplicity, let us assume in this application that the follower uses the same reference action s R j for all action choices of the leader. Finally, m 0 denotes the return every player obtains from total contributions to the public good. Interestingly, note how foregone options are introduced into the follower's utility function. When the relevance he assigns to the leader's unchosen alternatives approaches zero, i = 0, the follower only cares about the private and public good consumption. However, when he assigns a positive importance to foregone options, he experiences a higher utility from contributing to the public good when the leader's contribution is higher than the foregone option, s j > s R j , or a lower utility otherwise, s j < s R j . In addition, this utility function satis…es all the assumptions we consider in section 3, as the following lemma states.
Since we are discussing a sequential game where the follower decides how much to give out of a continuous strategy choice, the second mover best response function is easily found by solving the follower's utility maximization problem. We summarize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns weight i to the distance between the leader's actual contribution, s j , and the foregone contribution, s R j , the follower's best response function s C i (s j ) is given by Speci…cally, note that the introduction of the importance of foregone options into the second mover's utility function makes s C i (s j ) to pivot counterclockwise with respect to s N C i (s j ), with center at
Hence, the second mover relatively "reciprocates" the …rst mover's contributions, since he reduces his donation when s j < s R j , but increases it when s j > s R j . After …nding s C i (s j ), and by sequential rationality, we can now …nd the …rst mover's equilibrium contribution in this game.
Lemma 9.
In the sequential PGG, where the follower assigns a weight i to the leader's foregone options, the leader's donation in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is
Thus, the …rst donor submits a zero contribution when the second donor's concerns for foregone options are low enough, i < i . Clearly, when i = 0 the …rst donor also submits a null donation, which coincides with the equilibrium prediction in standard PGGs. However, when the second donor's concerns for foregone options increase enough, i > i , the …rst mover is induced to submit positive contributions that can trigger further donations from the second mover (given his reciprocating behavior described in the previous …gure). Additionally, note that as expected, the leader's contribution is increasing in the follower's concerns for foregone options, i , and in the foregone contribution that he uses as a reference point for comparison, s R j .
Proposition 6. In the sequential PGG where the second mover assigns a weight i to the …rst mover's unchosen alternatives, the following strategy pro…le describes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Proposer contributes
And the second mover responds by contributing
Particularly, the above results specify that by having a second mover concerned about the …rst mover's foregone options, the latter is induced to contribute (weakly) higher amounts than those she would donate in the case of facing a responder with no concerns about her unchosen alternatives.
From a more general perspective, by introducing a follower concerned about the leader's foregone options, we are able to obtain (weakly) higher levels of cooperation in the public good provision. where players are not concerned about unchosen alternatives. We show that, without relying on interpersonal payo¤ comparisons (i.e., within "strictly individualistic" preferences), our model predicts higher levels of fairness in the resulting allocation, as well as higher cooperation among the players, than standard game-theoretic models.
In addition, we demonstrate that this approach embeds as special cases many existing behavioral models: from inequity aversion to intentionsbased reciprocity. Therefore, this model o¤ers a broader and more unifying explanation of agents'
conduct than these models alone. Furthermore, when applying our model to di¤erent sequential games, we obtain interesting results. First, the equilibrium allocation in the ultimatum bargaining game is fairer than that resulting from standard game-theoretic predictions. Second, worker's e¤ort and …rm's proposed wages are higher than in the usual labor market gift exchange model.
Finally, equilibrium donations in the sequential public good game are higher than the predictions for standard models.
There are several natural extensions to the model introduced in this paper. First, it would be interesting to experimentally test under which payo¤ structures we can rationalize observed behavior using individuals' preferences over equitable payo¤s, and in which environments human conduct is instead mainly explained by the players'"strictly individualistic preferences" suggested in this paper. One direct test of the dominance of these two behavioral motives is, for example, the following ultimatum bargaining game. The proposer is allowed to make only two divisions of the pie, of size normalized to one. In the …rst treatment she can o¤er (0.4, 0.6), giving 0.4 to the responder and keeping 0.6 for herself, or the equitable payo¤ (0.5, 0.5). In the second treatment, the …rst division of the pie is …xed in (0.4, 0.6), but the second division is now (0.6, 0.4) instead.
Note that, conditional on the …rst o¤er, (0.4, 0.6), being made, the distance between the actual o¤er, 0.4, and the alternative o¤er is higher in the …rst treatment, 0:4 0:5 = 0:1, than in the second, 0:4 0:6 = 0:2. Hence, according to our equilibrium predictions, we should observe more rejections in the second treatment than in the …rst. However, if we observe higher percentage of rejections in the …rst than in the second treatment, it must be that responders in the …rst treatment evaluate the equitable payo¤s that the proposer did not select as a more desirable goal than the higher individual payo¤ he could have received in the second treatment.
Second, in this paper the space of available alternatives was exogenously determined before the beginning of the game. However, it would be interesting to allow players to strategically select their available choices before the game starts, given that the kindness other players perceive from their chosen actions depends on which available strategies are not chosen. That is, by strategically selecting her set of available alternatives, a player may achieve that other players infer a greater kindness from her actions. This strategic selection of available choices is observed in di¤erent contexts, where a player uses one of her unchosen alternatives as an excuse to support her actual choices, since the equilibrium payo¤ associated with that particular unchosen action would have been certainly worse than that from her chosen action. These extensions can certainly enhance our understanding of the role of players'foregone options on their opponents'incentives, and how such incentives can lead to higher degrees of cooperation from a strictly individualistic perspective. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Since s N C i (s j ) and s C i (s j ), then
by de…nition.
Proof of Proposition 1
We …rst show that player i's best response functions when she is concerned about player j's foregone options and when she is not, respectively, s C i (s j ) 2 arg max
contain a single point. Then, we show the result stated in proposition 1.
Note that player i's utility function when she is concerned about player j's unchosen alternatives, U C i (s i ; s j ), is strictly concave in s i and it is de…ned over a strictly convex domain. This guarantees that player i's best response function s C i (s j ) 2 arg max
A similar argument is also applicable for player i's utility function when she does not assign any relevance to player j's foregone options, U N C i (s i ; s j ), since it is also strictly concave in s i and it is de…ned over a strictly convex domain. 
That is, player i's marginal utility of raising her strategy when evaluated at the maximizer when she is unconcerned about foregone options, s N C i (s j ), is below the marginal utility she could achieve by using this same strategy s N C i (s j ) when she is not concerned about player j's unchosen alternatives, which is by de…nition zero. But this would violate assumption A5 (reciprocity), which states that, when D i (s i ; s j ) 0,
Hence, it can only be true that
Proof of Lemma 2
From proposition 1 we know that the di¤erence between player i's best response function when she is concerned and unconcerned about foregone options, 
and rearranging,
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us s C j and s N C j denote the leader's equilibrium strategies when dealing with a concerned and not concerned follower, respectively. Let us prove s C j > s N C j by contradiction. Hence, assume that s C j < s N C j . If this is the case, then the leader's marginal utility from raising her action must be higher when the follower is unconcerned about foregone options than when he assigns a positive importance to them. But this contradicts lemma 2. In particular, recall that lemma 2 states that the marginal utility of raising the proposer's action is higher for the …rst mover when the second mover is concerned about unchosen alternatives than when he is not. Hence s C j < s N C j must be false, and proposition 2 is satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using Segal and Sobel (1999), we know that player i's preferences over player j's actions can be represented 
which are all satis…ed in our model.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let us consider the receiver's utility function when he assigns a positive importance to the proposer's foregone options and when he does not, respectively, 
A3 is trivially satis…ed by player i. Regarding assumption A4 (kindness) is satis…ed since 
Proof of Lemma 4
Let (x j ; x i ) denote the proposed allocation that the proposer o¤ers to the responder. We know that the responder will accept any o¤er x i if and only if the utility he gets by accepting is weakly above than the (zero) utility he gets by rejecting. That is, x i + i (x i f i ) = 0 ()
Let us now check for su¢ ciency. Note that the responder does not to accept any o¤er x i < x i . Instead, accepting any o¤er x i < x i would imply negative utility levels, and the responder would be better o¤ by rejecting such an o¤er, obtaining zero utility. Thus, x i < x i cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Finally we need to check that the responder does not reject any o¤er above x i . Let us assume that the responder sets an acceptable thresholdx i > x i . Then, any o¤er x i such that x i < x i <x i would be rejected, and the responder would …nd that accepting it constitutes a pro…table deviation. Therefore, the acceptance threshold cannot be strictly above x i . Hence, the responder does not accept any o¤er x i 2 [0; x i ), but accepts any o¤er weakly above this threshold level x i .
Proof of Proposition 4
From lemma 8 we know the responder's acceptance threshold. Since the proposer wants to maximize the remaining portion of the pie which is not o¤ered to the receiver -and guarantees that the receiver accepts such division-he o¤ers For su¢ ciency, just note that the worker will never respond to an o¤er x i by exerting a higher e¤ort level than the one speci…ed in e(x i ). Indeed, on the one hand, if he exerts higher e¤ort levels, he will have more disutility from such e¤ort than the utility he derives from the third term of the above utility function for
On the other hand, if he exerts less e¤ort, then the marginal utility from exerting additional e¤ort when x i > f i (third term of the utility function) would be greater than the marginal disutility from exerting e¤ort (second term). Hence, the worker would be better o¤ by exerting more e¤ort. Hence, the above e¤ort level e(x i ) is optimal for the worker when the wage o¤ered is x i .
Proof of Proposition 5
As shown in the above lemma 2, the worker's optimal e¤ort level is given by e (x i ) = max 
